We discuss China's stance in the WTO post-accession, noting the many issues with implementation of China's accession terms by 2007. We evaluate how much benefit China can realistically receive from WTO membership given current problems with dumping actions against China and trade restrictions against textile and apparel exports. We discuss emerging WTO and non-WTO trade disputes involving China, and China's now extensive regional trade initiatives which raise issues of multilateral regional balance on China's trade policy strategy.
Introduction
Prior to the completion of the lengthy negotiations on Chinese WTO Accession, 1 there was extensive debate inside China on the merits of this step from a Chinese perspective. This debate has continued despite the initiation of implementation of the terms of accession now due to be completed by 2007. The talk in China today is of post-WTO China; and every new policy initiative is discussed not only in terms of its WTO compatibility, but also in terms of its ability to contribute to the implementation of the accession process and the eventual harnessing of China's resulting WTO benefits. The completion of accession negotiations was been hailed internally as a milestone in China's economic development, with claims of significant additions to growth potential, and a new policy environment underpinned by the single most important policy departure since Dung Xiao Ping's introduction of the responsibility system in 1976. At the same time, WTO accession has been criticized by detractors as establishing too quickly a western style market-oriented environment in China, which will likely lead to greater inequality and over-centralization, and has resulted in China giving away too many WTO bargaining chips which could have been more effectively used in later global negotiations.
From outside, this discussion inside China seems orthogonal to recent discussion of the WTO elsewhere. Globally there has until recently been pessimism on prospects for the completion of the Doha Round in 2005, 2 rejection of the WTO and global institutions by anti-globalization 1 These concluded with the adoption of the report by the WTO working party on Chinese Accession on November 10, 2001. 2 A significant change in atmosphere has occurred only recently. In June 2004 at a meeting in Georgia the G-8 countries following an EU initiative mutually agreed to terminate export subsidies in agriculture, removing a central impediment to forward progress in the agriculture negotiations in the Round. The EU have also removed all requests for a negotiation in competition policy and investment. The G-8 claim is that this will enable progress to be made in July on a final package but developing countries remain cautious. See Raymond Colitt, Financial Times, June 15, 2004, and Frances Williams, Financial Times, June 23, 2004. protesters, a sense of an overburdened and, at times, atmosphere-poisoned dispute settlement process in the WTO whose credibility is in some eyes increasingly becoming tarnished. 3 This pessimism is also compounded by growing acceleration of a seemingly post-Uruguay Round headlong rush into Bhagwati's spaghetti bowl of overflowing and inconsistent regionalism, with multiple US and EU regional initiatives, and many other bilateral or small new group arrangements.
The point of departure for this paper relative to the substantial literature on the possible impacts of Chinese accession 4 is to instead focus on China's WTO situation in the post-Uruguay Round pre-Doha Round completion period. 5 We focus less on accession and more on issues surrounding China's participation in the WTO post accession.
China, for now, even though a large entity with a significant and ever more sophisticated delegation in Geneva and an active trade ministry in Beijing has been largely content to observe and try to better understand WTO process, rather than to actively promote new initiatives. We ask a series of questions to help focus our discussion. We ask how important is the WTO membership now achieved to China in terms of yielding traditional access benefits to markets 3 The atmosphere in dispute settlement has been adversely affected by critical US-EU cases in bananas and growth hormones, where due to the time limits on process agreed to in the Uruguay Round, multiple panels are spawned by a single initial dispute, and the reports of one panel are never finally accepted by all parties. In our discussion we largely put on one side the use of the WTO as a masthead to cement and underpin domestic policy reform, which was seemingly a major factor in the Chinese decision to seek accession, and we instead discuss a series of key short to medium term trade access issues.
These include antidumping actions against China, a prospective new global trade regime in textiles and apparel following the end of the Multifibre Arrangement, and a growing list of trade conflicts both inside and outside the WTO. We ask what WTO membership can potentially do for China in these areas. We also ask how regional and multilateral trade strategies for China can best be commingled, and conclude with a discussion of how China's interests in the WTO overlap with those of other larger emerging economies (India, Brazil, and Russia) and with the WTO plurality of medium to small poorer countries who formally can outvote all in the WTO?
The two central arguments we make are firstly that China's WTO membership seemingly changes little on her two central access issues of antidumping and textiles and apparel. We also argue that the complexity both of the WTO agreements inherited on accession (around 26,000
pages of text to the Uruguay Round decisions) and of current Chinese policy instruments provide the potential to generate many new trade disputes involving instruments of policy not previously encountered by the WTO.
We further argue that China has split interests in future trade arrangements. She has a global interest in using strong multilateral trade rules, similar to that of Japan in the 1960s, to allow relatively unhindered access to currently large EU and North American markets to fuel continued export growth. But regionally and locally China can exert power in regional or bilateral negotiations to obtain preferential access to rapidly growing regional markets, but this is inconsistent with both the spirit and letter of multilateral rules. We suggest that finding a way to combine these two interests in securing her market access interests will be central to China's trade growth in the next few decades.
China is well placed strategically to exert great influence over developments in the trading system in the next few decades if she chooses to exercise strong leadership among emerging powers in fora such as the G20. How the WTO will be changed by Chinese membership, and whether China's accession terms may eventually be (de facto) renegotiated a little, are hence the final issues we discuss.
China's Interest in the WTO
There has been much discussion in the last few years of exactly what it was that took China into the WTO (or in Chinese eyes restored their GATT membership placed into suspension in 1950).
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Arguments range from the need to have the security of firm MFN benefits in place of previous insecure arrangements (and subject to periodic review and renewal), to the domestic uses of WTO membership by modernizers who wanted to see genuine market-based policy reform which would speed growth and reform and curb the power of provinces. For the larger powers negotiating with China (especially the US, the EU) the accession process, in some contrast, was seen primarily as an opportunity to pursue commercial policy interest and was not about engagement or isolationism. How could sharply improved access to a rapidly growing and potentially huge, if not dominant, market be secured, and at minimal cost in terms of formal reciprocal WTO commitments made to China? At the time of the conclusion of 7 As Long Yongtu, the former chief Chinese negotiator on accession (2000) . "We must let those [WTO] rules that stand at the core of the market economy, and which have to be obeyed, take firm roots in our society and country, so that our own market economy may become one that is truly orderly, efficient, honest and clean. But now in the WTO, China's interests will lie in both using WTO disciplines and in writing new WTO trade rules in ways which most effectively guarantee access to large export markets in Europe and North America. A central question for China in approaching the accession decision should, in our view, have been how far these objectives could be achieved inside the WTO rather than outside a system of WTO multilateral trade rules, and how the terms of accession should be crafted, rather than the broader security related issues of global engagement.
And today, if Chinese growth rests on continued manufactured export growth fuelled by inward foreign investment, then this trade growth, in turn, must also rest on relatively free and secure access to large markets abroad. This interest has parallels to that of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s which has long been considered to be one of the major gainers from the post-war GATT system, especially, since on the whole and in the main, the GATT delivered relatively free and nondiscriminatory access to key export markets during a period of sharp export growth. 
Some Key Short-to Medium-Term Trade and WTO Issues for China
China is now facing a number of trade and WTO issues in the short-to medium-term, which affect both her access to foreign markets and the access she gives to foreigners to Chinese markets. Some of these directly involve WTO disciplines; others are broader reflecting the operation of the wider trading system. If Chinese WTO membership is perceived to yield relatively little help in dealing with these problems, internal political commitment to WTO participation and even domestic policy reform might be weakened. Equally, how China maneouvres within the WTO process will affect global outcomes, China's future trade performance, and ultimately global economic performance.
Textiles and Apparel
Near the top of the list of key access related issues for China is textiles and apparel trade and the 1994, using a complex 10-year transitional process to achieve elimination.
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The MFA operates with agreed growth rate quotas on exports, complex rules of origin, transshipment rules, a monitoring and a consultation mechanism (a calls system) and with 44 exporters and eight North American and European importers. By wide agreement, over the years the MFA has slowed and restrained export growth in textile and apparel products, even though export shares from non-OECD countries have increased considerably.
Several issues now arise with its termination which affect all MFA exporters, but are especially critical for China. One is whether free trade will really replace the MFA. Scenarios for a post MFA elimination regime abound from a wave of new antidumping petitions from domestic producers in OECD countries being used to force a new market sharing regime (as happened in steel in the mid-1900s), to the use of safeguards measures (GATT 1994, Article 19) by OECD countries on textile and apparel products. China's interest is clearly in obtaining unhindered export access in this key area of Chinese trade performance through full access to OECD export markets for textile and apparel exports. The belief is both that exports to OECD countries will grow even more rapidly under free access, and that higher cost production which has relocated to smaller countries in the region because of quotas on Chinese exports will relocate to China. How China deals with these issues both in the WTO and outside could well be critical to China's medium term trade growth. One question is whether China has fresh leverage now that she is inside the WTO which she can use to ensure smooth and effective termination of restraints on these exports? Or is it the case that WTO membership makes little difference to the situation, since China was a MFA member both before and after WTO accession. If the former, can China now more effectively exert her leverage both formally and informally with other interested parties, such as India, so as to act in concert in any subsequent negotiations (such as on market sharing arrangements)? Also, can China use WTO membership to link her position on textiles and apparel to that on other issues, including the remaining implementation of her accession terms? One scenario that has been raised is that 
Anti-dumping
China also faces many critical challenges in the area of anti-dumping. 
Services
In the key service areas of banking, insurance and telecoms, China faces both the task of implementing far reaching commitments entered into in 2001, and of trying to manoeuvre on the access front with few service-related bargaining chips remaining since they were effectively surrendered when she accepted her WTO accession terms. Elsewhere, one of us has discussed these issues and raised questions as to the credibility and implementability of China's commitments in this area.
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In banking, China has agreed to remove all geographical restrictions on licences, and also to grant them in a non-discriminatory manner to both domestic and foreign entities, and to extend them to all types of business (including in banking to both domestic and foreign currency 24 See Whalley, 2003. transactions). If fully implemented, these commitments will effectively undermine the present fixed exchange rate Remnimbi regime, and also restrain the current practice of using state-owned banks in part as recapitalization agencies for loss generating state-owned enterprises (SOE).
There has been speculation that the end of such practice will significantly weaken Chinese trade performance, since effective subsidization of SOEs through these devices has fuelled her trade growth.
In insurance, the main Chinese commitment stands as one to non-discriminatory licensing for insurance providers and to also grant licenses free of any geographical restriction. Foreign negotiators believed at the time of the accession negotiations that this would effectively open the Chinese insurance market to foreign providers, but for now the indications are of more infrequent issuance of licenses to either domestic or foreign providers and hence more cartelization of Chinese insurance markets. In telecoms, the commitments relate again to the use of non-discriminatory licensing combined with significant liberalization in terms of foreign currency.
The WTO challenges for China in these service areas involve both the scope of the commitments and the extent of change they imply for the operation of the Chinese economy. A major and radical change is implied for the Chinese banking system if these commitments are fully implemented, since by 2007 if full implementation occurs, China will have by some measures the most open key service markets of any large global economy. And all of this will have been agreed to with no negotiating quid pro quo in terms of access to foreign service markets and with potential significant labour adjustment loss, although these currently appear to be unquantified.
In this area China must try to find a way to implement what seem to be over negotiated commitments, or try to obtain some formal concession in the WTO (perhaps for concession in non-service areas) for slowed implementation of the commitments.
Trade Disputes
China also currently faces a list of trade disputes, of which some have the potential to spawn a significant number of new WTO dispute panels. China has recently concluded a bilateral agreement on imports of coking coal from the EU, reflective of an approach of using bilateral accommodation to defuse trade conflicts. 33 China's import quota in this area is to be sharply increased, although not removed as WTO disciplines would seem to imply. This case will likely lead to similar deals with other exporters of coking coal to the Chinese market, and possibly similar deals in other product areas.
The Domestic Regulatory Regime
A final challenge for China which WTO membership implies is the extent of refocusing of the domestic regulatory regime that will be in implied in the medium term. Standards issues involving China's trade figure prominently in the USTR Foreign Trade Barriers report and include a lack of transparency in the certification process, lack of coordination among standards bodies and other agencies, burdensome requirements and long processing times for licenses.
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US companies do claim that achieving certification under China's Compulsory Certification system is time-consuming, difficult and costly, and that they are subject to redundant testing for cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and several consumer electronic products, inconsistent application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and excessive or inappropriate food labeling
requirements.
An illustration of these problems is China's Wireless LAN encryption standards, which differ from internationally recognized standards and force international companies to work through the few Chinese manufacturers who possess the necessary algorithm to meet these standards. According to Li Zhonghai, director of China's standardization watchdog, China now has 20,900 compulsory national standards covering safety, hygiene and environmental protection with more than 2,300 new national standards under creation. Only 44% of China's standards reflect agreed international standards (also according to Li Zhonghai) and the challenge is to modify remaining standards and elsewhere rewrite domestic regulatory standards. Such standard relate to health, safety, electrical, product liability and other matters. Standards are widely agreed to be a central area of impact of domestic policy regimes on trade, and are little researched. The issues in this area in the Chinese case seem to be quantitatively even larger than those for other economies.
Regionalism, China's Trade Policies and the WTO
It is in the area of regional trade agreements that some of the most central trade issues arise for Compared to recent regional trade agreements involving OECD countries, the CEPA is notable for its brevity (and hence some potentially significant degree of vagueness), and its absence of an additional dispute resolution mechanism beyond what WTO process implies. Disputes are to be resolved "through consultation in spirit of friendship and cooperation," 40 and all decisions of the CEPA steering committee are to be by consensus.
The CEPA has been notified to the WTO, even though China and Hong Kong are two separate WTO members. As the first regional agreement to be concluded by China, this seemingly sets the precedent for others that will follow, including potentially for some parts of the China-ASEAN agreement. Other possible regional partners for China include Korea, Australia -New Zealand, India and even Japan. For China, as for the US and the EU, the incentive is to adhere to strong multilateral WTO disciplines as a way of securing access to larger markets on non discriminatory terms, while seeking regional arrangements going beyond WTO rules with smaller entities giving China preferential regional access to smaller markets. The current US regional agreements stress preferential access in services, while EU agreements stress partnership and commonality in legal structure. As a large manufactured goods exporter, China's regional agreements for now stress preferential access in these areas, and so the structure of China's regional agreements will likely continue to differ significantly from those of other large trade entities. Cultural differences will also be reflected in such areas as dispute settlement, where Asian consensus will likely be stressed. For China, however, the issue will remain one of balance between WTO and regional trade objectives. 
China, the Doha Round, Trade Relations with Other Emerging Large Middle Income

Powers and Global Architecture
While China is now a key player in the WTO process China is not alone in both having negotiating power and being able to exercise this in her own interests in WTO process. How far China goes in exercising her influence jointly with other emerging middle income powers, such as India, Brazil and Indonesia, and powers yet to join the WTO such as Russia will be important.
On the one hand, these are economies in competition with China for export growth driven access to large markets in the EU and the US. But on the other hand the commonality of interest suggests that substantial opportunities exist for collaborative activity between China and these other countries, both within the WTO and outside. These are also more rapidly growing markets than in the OECD and increasingly are areas of significant export importance to China.
In the short term, Chinese interests in the WTO Doha Round are key. Optimism or pessimism on its outcome will play a role, as will China's interest in exercising leadership among the emerging large middle income powers in its conclusion. Agriculture and the export subsidization issue, until recently dividing the EU and the US, is one issue. But issues of implementation of Uruguay Round decisions preoccupying smaller and poorer countries, and associated matters of clarifying the interpretation of special and differential treatment also arise.
China is also a country with a large rapidly-growing economy effectively outside of the global institutional apparatus of the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF for nearly 50 years and formally joining this structure in 2001. For now China has been content to observe and move cautiously, but over time fundamental issues will arise for China as to how accepting she should be of this structure and where and how rapidly she should push for change, and with whom.
The WTO/WB/IMF triad to a large degree reflects the response of the US and the European powers to the immediate post-World War II concerns of achieving international economic stability and laying the preconditions for growth in the immediate post-1945 period. The aim was to prevent a return to the 1930s and the depression and economic dislocation that occurred (especially in Central Europe) after the First World War. The IMF was to guarantee a fixed exchange rate regime, the World Bank was to yield concessional financing for infrastructure in developing countries, and the ITO (and later the GATT and the WTO) was to be the vehicle to establish rules for the use of trade policy so as to facilitate trade growth globally.
But the world of today is no longer that of the 1940s, and while these agencies have changed over the years, whether they fully respond to the global challenges of today, especially as seen by China, is key. Longer term the issue for China and even now after only recently acceding to the WTO, is whether she should also be a prime global mover for a wholly new and reformed global institutional economic architecture?
Such an architecture could concentrate on issues of major concern to China more effectively then global institutions do at present. One area is that of global labour mobility, with restrictions in OECD countries on the free flow of cheap Chinese labour abroad. Another is the issue of certification procedures for the use of considerably cheaper Chinese services (medical services in China for instance) in place of OECD service provisions. Other key issues involve the environment, anti-trust, banking regulation and how they are dealt with globally.
Concluding Remarks
The paper looks beyond recent debate both in and outside China as to both the merits of and possible impacts from China's accession to the WTO (to be implemented between 2002 and 2007), and discusses China's stance in the WTO in the post accession period. China is now in the WTO; how to use WTO membership to serve China's trade interest is the issue, not an accession process already negotiated. Chinese growth has already changed the global economy, and our belief is that Chinese membership of the WTO will ultimately change both global economic performance and the shape of global economic institutions. We are at the start of this process, and here we try to raise a series of issues for wider debate.
Chinese is so large in population terms and, along with India, growing so rapidly that change in the global economy is now reflective of what is happening in China. Trade is a central part of this change, how China responds to the challenges she faces both in the WTO and outside it will affect future global performance and is of importance to us all, whether inside or outside China.
We ask how much difference formal WTO membership realistically makes to China's conduct of commercial diplomacy, especially in key areas such as textiles and apparel, anti-dumping, and handling emerging trade disputes. We also ask what this implies for China's interests in possible new global economic architecture.
China now stands in contrast to nearly all the major economic powers in seemingly building its latest developmental strategy around her accession to the WTO and implementation of accession terms. Outside China, the WTO does not enter domestic policy formation in this central way and there is much pessimism as to the WTO's prospects. On access issues, seemingly the WTO yields China less than the rhetoric of Chinese accession suggested and China's new found regional strategy is in part a manifestation of this. Whether the WTO will occupy the same central role in Chinese policy making in future years thus now seems to be in doubt.
